


The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505



Intelligence Community Staff

28 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM :

Director of Performance Evaluation
and Improvement

SUBJECT : Fixes on PRM-11, Task 2 Report

1. The meeting of 27 April left two incompatible objectives for fixing this report:

a. Compromising the remaining Department of Defense complaints;

b. Adjusting to your very basic complaints about the paper's judgments and tone as reflected in your marginalia and comments at the meeting.

2. The only way out of this box I see is to highlight sharp differences between the DCI and the Department of Defense on a few key issues and reflect these differences in the Summary.

3. The attached is my effort to infer your basic views on the key issues and, where appropriate, language that I am sure the Department of Defense would insist upon by way of counterpoint.

4. I would appreciate it if you would advise me as soon as possible (Home: [redacted] Office: [redacted]) whether I am on the right track. To meet the 1 June deadline, revision and retyping are already underway.

Attachment:
As Stated

28 May 1977

Issues and Arguments

1. Issue: Because the DCI is the President's principal foreign intelligence advisor and the senior full-time intelligence officer of the United States, there is a natural tendency to look to him for better Community resource management.

Argument: "In one view, held by the Department of Defense, this tendency can lead to an unwise deepening of the DCI's involvement in the management of other agencies' intelligence affairs, and an unhealthy dilution of the DCI's primary substantive role. In another view, held by the DCI, this tendency is both natural and legitimate; the resulting expansion of DCI responsibility can be appropriately addressed through delegation of duties as in the case of any range of management functions in Government."

2. Issue: Some (i.e., the Department of Defense) argue that the DCI's growing involvement in Community resource management will detract from his substantive role.

Argument: "The DCI, however, sees no conflict between his substantive duties and his Community management role; he believes, rather, that they are fully complementary."

3. Issue: Is a larger DCI role in managing resource allocations sensible and compatible with other roles?

Argument: "The DCI believes that his function as the senior national intelligence officer of the Government naturally and legitimately includes responsibility for better management of Community resources; with appropriate structures and authorities, he can fulfill these responsibilities in harmony with his other duties."

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4. Issue: Propriety, the paper asserts, is not mainly a matter of structure and authority, although clear lines of command and management responsibility are necessary. Propriety is also a matter of sound law, regulation, oversight, and professional ethics.

Argument: "Although legal responsibility for the propriety of intelligence operations runs from the President down through the line managers of the several intelligence agencies, the DCI believes that the President, the Congress, and the public expect him to act as virtual guarantor of the propriety of all United States' national foreign intelligence activities below the President. In the DCI's view, his authorities to satisfy these expectations are now less than adequate except in the case of CIA."

5. Issue: The federated structure of the national intelligence production community is basically appropriate to meeting the diverse needs of consumers, according to the paper. Most inadequacies of production are a matter of management attention and judgment rather than authority structure.

Argument: "The DCI believes that the diversified structure of the national intelligence production Community existing today is generally sound. In his view, however, more effective national intelligence production requires enhancing the DCI's authority to:

a. Task Community production elements outside CIA; *for national estimating activities.*

b. Task national collection assets that lie outside CIA;

c. Control the program management of the major NFIP elements.

DOD disagrees with this view. It believes, moreover, that such enhancements of DCI authority could materially degrade the responsiveness of DOD collection and production elements to DOD needs."

6. Issue: According to the paper, the Community affords a basic framework and gives the DCI appropriate authorities to make current collection activities responsive to the DCI and the diverse consumer elements they serve.

Argument: "In the DCI's view, however, enhanced DCI direct tasking or line authority over major national collection entities ~~may be required in practice~~ *is essential* to improve their responsiveness to all consumers. On the other hand, DOD is concerned that such enhanced DCI authority could work to reduce the responsiveness of those entities in DOD to DOD needs.

*& to eliminate the
high degree of
competetive overlap that
presently exists*